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Dicta Observes . .
THE NEW YEAR

The year 1932 is now history. The year 1933 lies ahead.
Tho its path be strewn with difficulties and obstructions, lawyers will continue conscientiously and with dignity to champion the rights of those in need of legal services. Wiser in
experience and seasoned in affairs of mankind, the bar stands
ready with renewed energy to uphold the honor of the profession and earn the respect of our fellow citizens.

THE NEW COURTHOUSE

Soon the courts will open sessions in the new municipal
building. Altho the building be new, the quarters spacious,
and the furnishings lavish, the same justice and fair dealing
and courtesy that has marked the attitude of our judiciary in
the past will continue in the future.

NEW YEAR GREETINGS

Dicta extends greetings of the New Year to all members
of the Denver Bar Association. It wishes them health, success
and happiness.

THE PROPER SITUS OF PUBLIC TRUSTEE
SALES
By F. W. Sanborn, Jr., of the Denver Bar
ODAY we have a very peculiar situation in Denver in
respect to the proper situs for sales now being held, and
to be held, by the Public Trustee under deeds of trust
prescribing that such sale be held at the "Tremont Street
Front Door of the Court House." A new Municipal Building stands practically ready to house all our courts and county
offices. A large number of these offices have already moved
to the new building, and the old structure is occupied only
by the various courts, the Sheriff's office and the office of the
Public Trustee and County Clerk and Recorder. No door
of the new Municipal Building faces on Tremont Street.
For many years deeds of trust executed to the Public
Trustee have had incorporated in the printed portion thereof
a provision that in the event of default, the Public Trustee
should make his sale at the "Tremont Street Front Door of
the Court House", or on the premises. It will, of course, be
only a matter of months until the old court house stands wholly
deserted and unoccupied, and only a question of a relatively
short time thereafter until this old landmark will be torn
down to make way for a more modern structure.
It is obvious to all that if there is any question at all
concerning the proper situs for a Public Trustee's sale under
such circumstances that the sale is properly held on the premises, or the deed of trust foreclosed in court as a mortgage.
However, both of these methods are inconvenient, and in the
latter case apt to be attended by delays which destroy, to some
degree at least, the security behind the deed of trust. This
paper will be confined to the legality of sales to be made at
the new Municipal Building, and the proper place at such
building for holding such sale.
There are many questions that will arise, and to anticipate them all at this time would be impossible. Two buildings are now in use. Which is the court house? The new
building is called the Municipal Building. Will it become
the "Court House" if not so designated? Will the old build-
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ing continue to be the "Court House" after the courts have
ceased to hold sessions there? The provisions of the deed of
trust are contractual. Should they be strictly enforced to require a sale at the specific place mentioned in the contract?
Would buyers at such sales naturally be expected to congregate at the Tremont Street door of the deserted building after
the new is in full use? Where should a sale take place that
is advertised at the Tremont Street door, when all county
offices pending advertisement have moved to the new structure? Is the power of sale rendered nugatory when the place
of sale named in the contract is no longer in existence? Many
of these queries have already received the attention of the
courts.
In developing this subject, I have arranged the material
geographically, rather than chronologically or according to
subject matter, as the cases practically speak for themselves.
ILLINOIS.

On October 9, 1871, the old courthouse of Cook County
was practically destroyed by the great Chicago fire, only one
wing thereof standing after the disaster. This wing, pending
and following the erection of a new courthouse upon another
site, was utilized for a part of the county offices, including the
criminal and county courts.
In the case of Waller v. Arnold, 71 11. 350 (1874), the
deed of trust, executed prior to the fire, provided for sale to
be made "at the North door of the courthouse of the County
of Cook, in the City of Chicago." At the date of the execution
of the deed of trust, the North door of the then courthouse
was fronting on Randolph Street. The new courthouse was
erected at the corner of Adams and LaSalle Streets, and had
two North doors, both fronting on Adams Street. The Trustee, undoubtedly desiring to "play safe", advertised two sales;
the first to be held January 30, 1874:
"At the East door of the two North doors on Adams Street of the court
house of the County of Cook in the City of Chicago, meaning the court house
on the comer of Adams and LaSalle Streets, the old court house having been
destroyed ;"

The second to be held January 31, 1874:
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"At the place midway in space between LaSalle and Clark Streets, in
the City of Chicago, where the North door of the old court house was, previous
to the fire,".

The appellant sought to enjoin both sales. Appellant
made the point that no sale could be made "at the place midway in space, * * * where the North door of the old court
house was, previous to the fire", because he insisted that the
destruction of the place of sale destroyed the power. His
argument was that the place of sale is one of the essential
elements of the power, and that wanting, the whole power is
rendered nugatory.
The court pointed out, however, that the objection was
not founded in fact, and hence the argument failed. One
wing of the former building still remained and was occupied
as a court house. True, the structures on the exact locality
were not as they were at the date of the execution of the deed.
The ruins were there, the place distinctly marked, and the
location of the place designated in the deed of trust was as
readily discovered as any public place in the city. The criminal and county courts were still held there, and process issued
by these courts was returnable there. The court said:
"We concede, the power to sell contained in this class of securities must
be strictly pursued, and the utmost fairness must be observed in the execution
of the power. But such strictness and literal compliance should not be exacted
as would destroy the power. This would render valueless the security
intended to be afforded.
"* * * It would be absurd to hold the power could not rightfully be
exercised at the 'north door' of a new court house, had one been erected on the
location of the one destroyed. The essential element in the power, is the place
rendered certain by the description given in the deed, and whether it is executed at the top or the foot of the steps, or whether they have been destroyed
and new ones erected, or whether there are none at all there, seems to us
wholly immaterial. The mere fact there has been a physical change in the
buildings at the point designated, ought not to be held to destroy the power.
This would be a narrow and illiberal construction, which we are unwilling
to adopt. While construing such powers strictly, they must have a reasonable
construction given to them. Greater strictness ought not to be required than
the parties, by a fair construction of the provisions of the deed, contracted
should be observed. Anything further savors of useless technicality. We
entertain no doubt whatever that the power of sale contained in this trust
deed can be well executed at the ruins of the north door of the old court
house in the city of Chicago."
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The court also pointed out that it was not essential to a
valid execution of the power given by the deed of trust that
it should be executed in or at the specific place designated in
the deed of trust, but that parties, in making their contracts,
must be presumed to have done so with reference to mutations
that must necessarily take place in all structures, however
permanently erected.
The above rule was followed by the same court in
Chandler v. White, 84 Ill. 435.
In the case of Alden v. Goldie, 82 Ill. 581 (1876), the
trust deed was executed prior to the fire of 1871, and the sale
was made subsequent to the erection of the new court house.
The notice for sale advertised a sale at the north door of the
new court house. Objection was made to the sale on the
ground that the trust deed did not authorize a sale at the place
advertised. The court said:
'It is insisted that the intention was, that the sale should be at the
north door of the then court house, at the time of the execution of the trust
deed. But the intention is to be derived from the language of the trust deed.
There is nothing in that restrictive of the place of sale to the site of the then
existing court house. But it is general, authorizing the sale 'at the north
door of the court house in said city of Chicago.' The advertisement of sale
is, at a designated north door of the court house in the city of Chicago.
"The place, as advertised, fulfills, in terms, the requirement of the trust
deed. It abundantly satisfies its true spirit and intent."

The same rule is observed in the case of Wilhelm v.
Schmidt, 84 Ill. 183 (1876).
In Gregory v. Clarke, 75 Ill. 485 (1874), the court held
that as between the two court houses in Chicago following the
fire, the proper place for holding the sale was at the new court
house, where the circuit and superior courts were held, rather
than at the old court house, which had been remodeled to the
use of the county and criminal courts.
It would appear, therefore, that under the Illinois rule,
where there was a door in the new court house that in general
terms fitted the description for place of sale in the deed of
trust, that a sale would be proper either at the old site or at
the new court house, but preferably at the new court house.
It is interesting to note, however, that the published notice
of sale was very specific in each instance, and left no doubt
in the minds of bidders as to where the sale was to take place.
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TEXAS.

Somewhat similar problems have been passed upon by the
Texas courts. Briefly, the three authorities found, held as
follows:
Williams v. Pouns, 48 Texas 141. A deed of trust requiring a sale to be made at the court house of the county is
properly executed by the sale at the court house of a newly
organized county which includes the land sold.
Hickey v. Behrens, 12 S. W. 679, (Texas 1889). Under
a deed of trust providing for a sale at the East door of the
court house, a sale at the South door is valid in the absence
of proof of injury thereby.
It should be noted in connection with this last case, however, that such a sale might not provide the purchaser with
a marketable title, in view of the fact that an aggrieved owner
of the equity might come into court after such a sale and
show injury, and thus have the sale set aside.
Miller v. Boone, 23 S. W. 574 (Texas 1893). Where
by statute "court house door" is defined as "either of the principal entrances to the house provided by proper authority for
holding of the district courts", a sale held at the door of a
house used by the commissioners and county courts was declared void where the Opera House had previous to the sale
been designated as the place for the holding of the district
court.

MISSOURI.
Missouri furnishes us with the greatest wealth of authorities on the problems before us.
The case of Hambrightv. Brockman, 59 Mo. 52 (1875),
decided at about the same time as the Illinois case of Waller
v. Arnold, supra, seems to adopt a different viewpoint. Here
the deed of trust provided for a sale "at the courthouse door
in the City of Independence." When sale was made, the court
house had been partially taken down and was undergoing repairs. The courts were held in the upper room of a building
on the public square over a bank. The Trustee on the day
of sale went to the North door of the court house and proclaimed that as the court house had been torn down to its first
story, he would sell at the front entrance of the place where
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the courts were then held at "Bank Hall". The court, in
holding that the sale was properly held at the place where
the courts were temporarily held and not at the court house,
said:
"The object of such deeds, as the object of our law on the subject of
execution sales, is to secure a sale at a public place, and when a court house is
mentioned, it is obviously designed to designate the building where courts are
held, and where the people attending such courts are supposed to congregate.
If the court house, established at the time the deed is made, is burned down
or in such a dilapidated condition that no court is held there, the object of
publicity would not be attained by selling at the deserted spot where such.
building had stood. In this case the sale was made at the door of the building
temporarily used as a court house, during the sessions of the court therein, and
this holding to all intents and purposes constituted the building a court house
and the court house of Jackson County at that time."

In Napton v. Hurt, 70 Mo. 497 (1879), the deed of trust
provided for sale at "the West door of the courthouse." Subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, the court house was
moved and had been by law established at a new locality and
there was no West door. The trustee advertised his sale for
the new court house door. The court held that the Trustee
must sell at the new place and not at the old, and cited with
approval the case of Hambright v. Brockman, supra.
In Davis v. Hess, 15 S. W. 324 (Mo. 1891 ), the trust deed
provided for sale "at the courthouse door", but at the date
of execution there was no court house proper, the old one
having been removed. At the date of sale a new court house
was in the course of construction on the site formerly occupied
by the former county building, and the courts were being held
in a Church, while other county offices were scattered about
the court house square. The sale was well attended and made
at the new, but unfinished, building. In approving the place
of sale, the court said:
"Sales under powers contained in mortgages and deeds of trust have
always been regarded by this court as a harsh method of cutting off the equity
of redemption, and hence it has been held that the utmost fairness must be
observed in the execution of such powers. But, as said in Waller v. Arnold,
71 I1l. 350, such strictness and literal compliance should not be exacted as
will destroy the power. This would render valueless the security intended
to be afforded. These parties intended there should be a sale upon the contingencies named, and they fixed the court-house door as the place where it
should take place. In ascertaining this place, we must look to the circum-
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stances as they existed at the date of the sales. In doing this, we do not see
how a person in search of the place named in the deed of trust could be misled.
With a church building used by the county for a few weeks in the year for
holding the circuit court only, the county officers scattered around in different
buildings, and a structure erected on the public square expressly for a courthouse, we think no one would hesitate in calling the latter the court-house
within the meaning of the deeds of trust, though not yet completed."

From the above case, it might be thought that a "court
house" is not necessarily a place where the courts are, at the
time, held, but that what is meant by the "court house" must
be determined by the circumstances in each case. Who would
question that the new "Municipal Building" will be the
"court house" after it comes into full use for practically all
county purposes?
We now come to the best considered of the reported cases,
the case of Stewart v. Brown, 20 S. W. 451 (Mo. 1892). The
Trust deed provided for sale at "the East courthouse door of
the City of St. Joseph." When the Trust Deed was executed
the courthouse was situated between Fourth and Fifth Streets.
In 1885 the courthouse was partially destroyed by fire, and
at the date of the sale the circuit court was held on the third
floor of a building situated on the Northwest corner of Sixth
and Francis Streets, and the county and probate courts were
held in a building situated on the Northeast corner of Second
and St. Charles Streets. These buildings were not near to
one another, nor near the partially destroyed courthouse. The
trustee in his published notice stated he would sell "at the
front door of the courthouse in the City of St. Joseph", and
he sold the same "At the front or north door, that led upstairs
to the part of building occupied by the circuit court when in
session, on the corner of Sixth and St. Francis Streets." The
circuit court was not in session on the day of sale. The lower
court held that the sale as made was good. On appeal the
Supreme Court, in a department decision found in 16 S. W.
at page 389 (1891), held that the sale was void and that the
sale should have taken place "at the east door of the old
courthouse." The court said:
"The deed of trust must be read in the light of the circumstances as
they existed at its date, and when it designates the place of sale by a particular
door of the house it locates that place as specifically as if it had mentioned
the particular block of ground. * * * In this case the parties did not stop with
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the words 'court-house door' or any such general words, but they go on, and
fix the particular door of the court-house, thus making the place specific. To
hold otherwise is to say that the parties assumed that the county would always
have a court house with an east door. * * "
'A court-house may be a place where a court or courts only are held,
but that is not the sense in which the words are generally used when applied
to our county houses, for they generally signify a building where all of the
county affairs are or are designated to be transacted. A 'court-house' may,
under some circumstances, be an incompleted building, not yet used for holding
courts or occupied by any county officer, within the meaning of a deed of
trust. Davis v. Hess (Mo.) 15 S. W. 324. Looking to the circumstances
* * * we think the building, and the only one, which could be called the
'court house' within the meaning of the deed of trust, was the building which
was partially destroyed by fire."

Although not clear from the reported cases, a rehearing
was apparently granted and in an en banc decision a divided
court modified its previous decision, and, while holding that
the sale was void for lack of definiteness in the advertised
place of sale, held that under ordinary circumstances the
proper place of sale would not be the old courthouse, but that
place in use as a court house at the time of sale. Justice
Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, approves that part
of the former decision reading:
"The place where these sales under deeds of trust given to secure debts
must be made depends upon the terms of the deed of trust. Such sales may
be made at any place agreed upon by the parties. Nor is it necessary that they
should be made during the session of a court, as is the case in sales under
executions. The place of sale, like the power of sale itself, is a matter of
contract; and it follows that in determining the place of sale we must look
to the intention of the parties as expressed in the deed of trust. It is to the
intention thus expressed that the purchaser must look, for the trustee has no
right to deviate from the expressed terms of sale, and, if he fails to make the
sale at the designated place, it will not cut off the equity of redemption."

Thomas, after reviewing a number of cases on the subject,
many of which have already been cited, states that in view
of the prior decisions in Missouri, a rule of property had been
established validating sales at the courthouse in use at the
time of such sale, saying:
"The deed of trust * * * is to be construed as if it contained the
proviso that, in case the then courthouse should be abandoned as a courthouse or destroyed, the sale of the trustee might be made at the door of the
courthouse existing at the time of the sale, * * * No evil, in our view, either
great or small, can proceed from a sale of land under powers contained in
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mortgages at the courthouse door, wherever that may be, provided the notice
specifically designates the place of sale. Courthouses are places of public resort,

and there are many reasons why auction sales should occur there. * * * It
would have been manifestly more appropriate to have sold the property at
the door of the building in which the circuit court was held than to have
sold it at the east door of a building once used as a courthouse, but then
partially destroyed by fire, and utterly abandoned as a courthouse. The
former was a public resort, where such sales usually occur, while the latter
was not."

Chief Justice Sherwood, in a special concurring opinion,
says :
"* * * Where parties draw up a deed of trust they contemplate that

a default in payment may occur, and so they provide for a place of sale in
the event of such default. They designate a place of sale, but with that idea
of locality they couple the idea of publicity, and, as the court-house--the
place where circuit and other courts are held-is usually the place par excellence where bidders and buyers do most congregate, they provide that the
sale shall occur there, at the building used for that purpose; in a word, use is
as potent a factor, or even more so, than locality. If the building then used
for the purposes of a court-house have several doors, designation is made of
the door where such sales are accustomed to occur, so that where the 'east
door' or the 'west door' of the courthouse is thus designated it is only equivalent to saying that the sale contemplated shall occur-First, at the courthouse; and, Second, at that particular point 'at the court-house where such
sales are usually made.' But suppose the court-house be wholly or partially
destroyed, or become so dilapidated as to be unfit to use and to require repair,
or be removed by law to another locality, or, owing to changes made in the
building itself, the designated 'east' or 'west' door is bricked up, and another
opening made. What then? Does any one of the facts aforesaid cause the
power of sale vested in the trustee to lapse? By no means, unless restrictive
words are used, showing a determination to confine the sale to the specified
locality,-to the then court-house; otherwise the law will presume that the
contracting parties so drafted the instrument that it would cover any of the
contingencies named, of destruction, of dilapidation, and consequent repair,
or of removal by operation of law, or of change in the structure of the building. The law is practical, and presumes that parties employing its forms to
secure and enforce individual rights will be equally practical in contemplating
matters which, in the course of human events, are not unlikely to happen.
Take, for instance, the case of a courthouse built on the banks of the alluvial
soil of the Missouri River. A flood sweeps away the soil on which it rests,
and it falls into the turbid waters. In such case the very locality, to all
intents and purposes, is gone, and another building is selected or erected for
a court-house, and courts, as at the old one, are held there. Can it be possible
that the trustee, in order to make a valid sale, would have to proceed to the
site of the original court-house in a flatboat, and there make the sale? Such
would certainly be the case if the idea of locality alone is to control. The
new location would still fill the requirements of the deed. It would be 'the
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court-house;' and, even if the deed should require a sale at the 'east door' of
the court-house, and the building selected should have no 'east door', this
would not invalidate the sale, provided that the sale should occur at the only
door of such a building as the deed of trust mentions."

As Judge Barclay pointed out in a special opinion in this
case, when there is any question as to procedure, it is always
well to institute foreclosure proceedings in court.
The rule announced in the above case was followed in
Snyder v. Chicago Ry., 33 S. W. 67 (Mo. 1895).
The case of Riggs v. Owen, 25 S. W. 356 (Mo. 1894),
follows the above case, the court saying:
"We consider it settled that when a building is selected and occupied
by the proper authorities as and for a courthouse, when the courthouse proper
is destroyed, or is abandoned for any good cause, a sale required by a deed of
trust to be made at the courthouse door may be made at such temporary
courthouse so selected. Hambright v. Brockman, 59 Mo. 52; Napton v.
Hurt, 70 Mo. 497; Stewart v. Brown, 112 Mo. 171, 20 S. W. 451. The
sale in this case was made at the only door of the building so selected, so far
as disclosed by the evidence, and we think was a compliance with the stipulation of the deed in this respect."

In Gray v. Worst, 31 S. W. 585 (Mo. 1895), where there
were two courthouses in the county, and the trust deed provided for sale at the "door of the courthouse", one courthouse
being at the county seat, the court held that the sale was
properly held at the courthouse at the county seat.
The Missouri authorities, therefore, seem to hold that,
where the new building is in use, either permanently or temporarily, as the place where the courts of general jurisdiction
hold their sessions, that it is ordinarily the duty of the Trustee
to hold his sale at the new place. It is interesting to note, however, that these courts also place great stress upon the published notice of sale. There is no doubt but that such notice
must be definite and specific as to just where the sale is to be
held.
GEORGIA.

The Georgia Supreme Court has followed the majority
rule in the case of Payton v. McPhaul, 58 S. E. 50, (Ga. 1907).
The mortgage, with power of sale, provided that in event
of default, the mortgagee was authorized to advertise and sell
the property "before the courthouse door in the Town of
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Isabella, Ga., four weeks' notice of such sale being made by
publication in a newspaper published in the town of Sylvester;" At the time the mortgage was executed the county site
of Worth County was the town of Isabella. At the time the
power of sale was exercised the county site was at the City of
Sylvester. The court, in approving the sale at the courthouse
at the time of sale, said:
"The power of sale in a mortgage must be construed like other parts of
the contract, so as to effectuate the intention of the parties; and this is true
as to the place of sale, as well as in regard to the other stipulations in the
power. There are numerous cases dealing with the question as to the validity
of sales where, for some reason, the place of sale, as indicated by the strict
terms of the power, was not chosen as the place of sale on account of events
transpiring between the date of the execution of the instrument and the date
that the power was exercised. When the power provides that the sale shall
be at the courthouse door, the rebuilding, removal, destruction, or temporary
abandonment of the building raises a doubt as to where the sale should be had
under the power. The general rule is that, where the door of the courthouse
is designated as the place of sale, the building is referred to in its character
as an official and public building, and that, therefore, the place of sale is the
courthouse at the time of the foreclosure, rather than the place used for that
purpose at the time the mortgage is executed. This has been held even where
the courthouse was temporarily abandoned, as well as in cases where the
building was destroyed or permanently abandoned. The decisions, however,
are by no means in harmony. No general rule seems to have been laid down
fixing the place of sale when there has been a new location of the courthouse."

The court goes on to review some of the cases already
discussed, and continues:
"It will be seen, from an examination of these authorities, that the court
is in each instance endeavoring to ascertain the intention of the parties and
carry it into effect as to the place of sale, and that wherever there has been a
change of the location of the courthouse between the date of the execution of
the mortgage and the date of the sale the sale has been upheld, even though
at the new place, if it was fairly conducted, and no injury was shown to have
resulted from conducting it at such place. The power in the mortgage under
consideration declares that the sale shall be 'before the courthouse door in the
town of Isabella, Ga.' The question is whether it was the intention of the
parties that the sale should be held at the place for legal sales for Worth
County, or whether it was the intention that the sale should be at the town
of Isabella, without reference to whether legal sales were conducted at that
place. A sale could never be had in strict compliance with the power; for the
reason that at the date of the sale there was no courthouse door in the town
of Isabella. It may be that the old building formerly used was still there,
but it was no longer the courthouse of the county. It does not appear that
the land was situated in the town of Isabella, nor is there anything to indicate
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whether it was nearer the town of Isabella than to the city of Sylvester. It
would be a reasonable construction of the terms of the power that it was the
intention of the parties that the sale should be held at the county site, rather
than at the place which was no longer the place of holding sales for the county.
The use of the word 'courthouse' is significant. Isabella can be considered
as simply descriptive of the place where the courthouse was situated, and not
as the place designated for the sale. But the courthouse door is the place.
The courthouse door of Worth county was at the date of the sale in Sylvester.
We think the power was properly. executed by the sale at the courthouse door
of Worth county; that is, in the city of Sylvester."
MISSISSIPPI.

The last word on the subject is found in the case of Miller
v. Magnolia Building and Loan Association, 134 So. 136
(Miss. 1931), just recently decided. Here the trust deed provided for sale at the "East front door of the court house."
The notice for sale stated that the sale would take place "at
the front door of the county court house in Hinds county, at
Jackson, Miss." The deed of trust was given when the old
county court house was being occupied, and the main entrance or front door thereof fronted East, and all public or
judicial sales were made at the East front door thereof. Before the deed of trust in the case at bar became in default, and
before the sale was advertised, the new court -house was built
and occupied, and its main entrance faced north, the new
court house being built upon a different lot. The county
officers and courts had moved into the new court house.
It was contended that the sale being advertised as it was,
and the contract stipulating that the sale was to be made at
the east entrance of the county court house, confusion would
arise in the mind of bidders, and that they would fear to bid
because of the rule of strict construction which is applied to
sales en pais under deeds of trust, and the probability that the
property would not bring the amount of the debt, and that the
grantor in the deed of trust would suffer thereby and lose his
property; and, perhaps, suffer judgment for the balance due.
The court, in passing upon the questions involved, said:
"We are confronted with the purpose and meaning of the stipulation
in the contract. It appears that the dominant purpose of the stipulation is
to have the sale made at the courthouse, meaning the courthouse in existence
at the time the sale should be conducted, and that the provision as to the east
front door is a subordinate provision to the main dominant provision. It was
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manifestly the purpose of the parties to have the sale conducted at the courthouse, and at that part of the courthouse where similar sales were usually
made, and at such part where people generally entered the courthouse for
business purposes. It would be detrimental, rather than beneficial, to grantors,
to have the sale conducted on the east side of the new courthouse rather than
on the north side. The main entrance is where people generally enter a
courthouse.
"The provision as to time and place of sale, etc., was, of course, for the
benefit of both parties, but primarily for the property owner whose property
is to be sold. It is designed to make the property bring as high a price as a
public sale will afford; and, certainly, where people are liable to be when the
sale is to be made.
"We are satisfied that a sale at the north entrance complies with the
intent of the contract, although it does not strictly comply with the letter
in all respects. It does comply with the requirement that the sale be made
at the courthouse, and, as held before, this was manifestly the dominant idea
in conducting the sale. It, of course, meant a house where courts and county
officers are located and do business, rather than an abandoned building which
had formerly been held for court purposes and county offices, but where now
no public business is ever conducted."
COLORADO.

The Colorado courts have had one occasion to remark
upon the proper situs of a Trustee's sale. In the case of
Martin v. Barth, 4 Colo. App. 346, (1894), the court, in substance, held that where the Trustee was empowered to sell the
property at the front door of the court house, a sale fairly
made at a door of a building on the side named and in full
view of every other door on that side, although not at the door
leading to the court room, is not such a deviation as to invalidate an act otherwise regular.
CONCLUSION.

It occurs to me that while the decisions are not in complete harmony, the law is now sufficiently well settled to assure
that Public Trustee's sales made after occupancy of the new
building by our courts will be properly advertised and held
at the new situs, even though the trust deed specifies a sale
at the old Tremont Street door of our present court house.
While named the "Municipal Building", the new structure
will, in fact, be the court house when the courts have moved
in and are holding their sessions there. The law must be
practical in its interpretation of contracts. Parties to trust
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deeds naturally anticipate that a sale thereunder shall take
place at a public place where buyers are apt to congregate,
and where the greatest number of bidders will be present.
The door of the deserted court house could not fulfill such
a description. It is of first importance, however, that the
advertised notice of sale accurately describe the place of sale.
It would not be sufficient to advertise a sale at "the front door
of the courthouse", but the notice should be specific and in
no uncertain terms definitely describe the place where the sale
is to be made: for example, "the Main Bannock Street front
door of the Municipal Building at the Civic Center, in the
City and County of Denver, Colorado." Where the courts
move pending advertisement of notice for sale at the "Tremont
Street front door", the sale may take place where advertised,
so long as the old door of the courthouse is still well marked
and readily found, but it would be best in such a case for the
Public Trustee, on the morning of such a sale, to make public
announcement at the Tremont Street door that the sale would
be held at the Bannock Street door of the new building.
After the courts have moved and the municipal building becomes to all practical purposes the court house, all notices of
sale should name the main-front door of the new building,
and the sale should be held at that place.
As to sales now being advertised for, and made at, the
Tremont Street front door of the court house, such sales are
unquestionably valid, inasmuch as the trust deed provides for
a sale at that place, and, in addition thereto, the old structure
is still the "court house" and will continue to be such "court
house" so long as courts of general jurisdiction continue to
hold their sessions there.

Peter J. Troy has entered the general practice of law with offices at 1022
University Building. He is also a member of the Illinois Bar. For the last
three years he has been Secretary of General Stone Company and General
Agent of Coughlan-Rogin Company, which companies fabricated the exterior
granite for the new City and County Building of Denver.

THE LAWYER AND THE PUBLIC
SERIES of radio addresses beginning February 12,
1933, sponsored by the American Bar Association and
arranged by its Council on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar under the auspices of the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, will be heard as follows
over the Columbia Broadcasting Station and weekly thereafter at an hour to be announced:
Clarence E. Martin, President of the American Bar Association-"The
American Bar, Its Past Leaders and Its Present Aims and Ideals."
Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School-"Training for the Bar."
George W. Wickersham, President, The American Law Institute--"Restating the Law."
John Kirkland Clark, Chairman, Section of Legal Education of the American
Bar Association-"The Lawyer's Education."
John H. Wigmore, Dean Emeritus, Northwestern University Law School"Should the Public Distrust a Lawyer?"
James Grafton Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State-A Young Man in Search
of a Profession Interviews Mr. Rogers on the Subject "Shall I Become
a Lawyer ?"
Silas Strawn, Former President of the American Bar Association and of the
United States Chamber of Commerce-"The Lawyer and Business."
Guy A. Thompson, Former President of the American Bar Association"What is the Bar Doing to Improve the Administration of Justice?"
Henry W. Toll, Managing Director American Legislators' Association"Reforming the Law Through Legislation."
Philip J. Wickser, Secretary New York Board of Law Examiners, Hon.
Theodore Francis Green, Governor of Rhode Island, and Robert T.
McCracken, Chairman of the Philadelphia County Board of Law
Examiners-"Sifting Candidates for a Lawyer's License."
Newton D. Baker, President of the American Judicature Society-"When
Lawyers Speak with One Voice."
Professor Karl Llewellyn of the Columbia University Law School, Professor
Walter Wheeler Cook of the Institute of Law of Johns Hopkins
University, and Mr. Jerome Frank, Lecturer at the Yale Law School
--"How the Law Functions in Society."
Professor Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School, on a subject to be
announced later.
Judge Learned Hand of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals--"How
Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision ?"
John W. Davis, Former Solicitor General of the United States, Former
Ambassador to Great Britain and Former President of the American
Bar Association-"Selecting Judges."
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BOOKS RECEIVED
AT THE SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, as Adopted and Promulgated by the
American Law Institute at Washington, D. C., May 6th, 1932. Colorado
Annotations. 2 vols.
Wharton's Criminal Law. By Francis Wharton. 12th Ed. 1932. 3 vols.
Accidental Means; a Brief on the Insuring Clause of Personal Accident
Policies. By Martin P. Cornelius. 1932.
Encyclopedia of Automobile Law. By Xenophon P. Huddy. 9th Ed. 1932.
11 vols.
Public Utilities. By Oscar Pond. 4th Ed. 1932. 3 vols.
Scott's Translation of the Civil Law. (Corpus Juris Civilis). By Samuel
Parsons Scott. "The first and only complete translation in English of
the Civil Law." 1932. 17 vols.
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations. By William Meade Fletcher.
Revised and Permanent Edition. By Basil Jones and the Publisher's
Editorial Staff. 15 volumes published to date.
Federal Tax Handbook. Revenue Act of 1932. By Robert H. Montgomery.
The Law of Oil and Gas. By W. W. Thornton. 5th Ed. 1932. Revised
and Rewritten by Simeon S. Willis. 3 vols.
All Federal and State Reports, Statutes, Session Laws, etc., up to date.

IMPORTANT NOTICE
SALE BY DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
The following list of Furniture and Office Equipment, formerly used by
the Law Library in the Old Court House, is to be sold. Most of this furniture, purchased less than three years ago, is practically new and in very good
condition. You may find just what you have been looking for, at a bargain.
The furniture is on display at Kistlers, in the furniture department, in charge
of Mr. White:
(a) I linoleum top desk
(b) 3 linoleum top tables
(c) 2 small tables
(d)
1 large table
(e) 4 arm chairs with leather seats
(f)
1 straight chair with leather seat
(g)
1 rocking chair with leather back and cushioned seat
(h)
1 chair with arm
(i)
10 straight-backed chairs
(j)
glassed-in sectional bookcases
(k) shelving for books
(1) linoleum
(m) 2 polished brass cuspidors or spittoons.

+++
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THOMAS & THOMAS
The late Judge J. McD. Livesay spoke at the Denver Bar Association
memorial services of 1926 of the life of Theodore H. Thomas. He told of
an occasion of which Mr. Thomas often related. It seems that Thomas &
Thomas had a law office in the booming mining camp of Creede, many years
ago. Theodore and Thornton were twins; and so alike one could not tell
them apart. Theodore was an expert billiard player; Thornton an indifferent
one. Theodore was an expert billiard player; Thornton an indifferent one.
Theodore played rarely; Thornton persisted in playing. One afternoon
Thornton was challenged by a stranger. They went at it hammer and tongs
at five dollars a game. It wasn't long before the stranger had all of Thornton's money. Thornton put his cue on the table and said he would run out
and get some more money and be back in a minute. He ran across the street
into the law office and told Theodore all about it. Theodore rushed over to
the billiard hall, picked up the cue and told the stranger he was ready to resume the game. In about half an hour Theodore had in his pocket all that
Thornton had lost and all the stranger's money besides. The stranger put
his cue in the rack and remarked sadly: "You certainly improved wonderfully in the last half hour."

LETTER FROM DENISON, SOMETIME J.
Louis A. Hellerstein, Esq.,
Editor in Chief, DICTA,
1020 University Building,
City.
Dear Sir:
Perhaps I may suggest to Mr. Hilliard that he could get a little fun out
of ridiculing legal absurdities.
I enclose a couple:
The first sentence of an opinion reads: "The plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant." 8 C. A. 130.
Another one: "This case was reversed because the complaint had not
informed the defendant of the facts which the defendant had proved in the
trial." 8 C. A. 158, 167-8.
Very truly yours,
JOHN H. DENISON.

(EnrroiT's NoTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MOTOR VEHICLE ACT-APPLICATION TO RENTED
DRIVERLESS

CARs-The Driverless Car Co., et al. vs. Armstrong as Secre-

tary of State-No. 13078-Decided September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler.

The plaintiff and others engaged in the business of renting driverless
cars sought to restrain the Secretary of State from enforcing against them

certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, as follows:
(a) That section which provides that " if the owner rents or intends
to rent the vehicle without a driver, it shall not be registered unless and until
the owner shall agree to carry insurance, or . . . unless the owner shall

demonstrate his financial ability to respond in damages for injury or death;
or unless the owner shall furnish a surety bond."
(b) The section requiring the owner of a driverless car to carry
public liability insurance.
(c) The section providing "that there shall issue for every passenger
motor vehicle, rented without a driver, the same type of number plates as
that issued for private passenger vehicles."
Held.-I. The act is not unconstitutional on the ground that the
subjects treated in the act are not expressed in the title. The act is entitled
"An act relating to motor and other vehicles, providing a penalty for the
violation thereof and repealing all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith."
The title to the act is sufficiently broad to cover the provisions challenged in
this suit.
2. The act is not unconstitutional on the ground of its being a special
law where a general law can be made applicable. This law is general and
uniform in its operation.
3. The act does not deny any person the equal protection of the laws.
There is no unreasonable classification. The question of classification is
primarily for the Legislature. The legislature did not act unreasonably in
imposing upon the owners of driverless car owners alone the requirements
found in the challenged provisions of the act. The legislature may well have
believed that one who has no pecuniary interest in the automobile he drives
has less inducement to drive carefully upon the public thorofares and is more
likely to become a menace to person and property than one who has such
pecuniary interest.
4. The act is not an unreasonable interference with a purely private
business; on the contrary, they rest upon the unquestioned power of the state
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in the interests of public safety to prescribe terms under which the public
highways can be used for a gainful business.
5. The act does not operate to deprive plaintiffs of property without
due process of law.
6. The act does not offend against any other provisions of the Constitution, State or Federal, in so far as the parts of the act challenged in this suit
are concerned.--Judgment affirmed.
ESTOPPEL-FoRECLOSURE SALES--EVIDENCE - EXPERT WITNESSES - NATURE OF PRoPERTY-Moul vs. Thompson et al.-No. 12644-Decided

September 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. One who claims ownership of personal property, adverse to the
interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee of a chattel mortgage describing
such property, but who stands silently by while the property is being sold on
foreclosure of the mortgage and who sees the purchaser at such sale invest
his money in the property, will be estopped from later asserting his claim as
against the purchaser.
2. Testimony of the purchaser, that such property formed a part of
the basis of his bid, is admissible to support his plea of estoppel.
3. Testimony of expert witnesses as to custom in the sale of property
of this type, and as to what property, in their opinion, was included in a bill
of sale, is proper to enable the court to determine how the parties to a document of doubtful meaning probably understood its terms.
4. Finding, based on conflicting evidence, that blowers, tanks, piping,
wiring, etc., are personalty, sustained.-Judgment affirmed.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION TO UNKNOWN PERSONS---JURISDICTION -

APPEARANCE -

ACTION BARRED AFTER APPEARANCE -

WHAT

CONSTITUTES-Cole vs. Fiese et al.-No. 12749-Decided Sept. 26, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
In an action of foreclosure, wherein a trust deed was foreclosed, plaintiff
was not served personally but by publication and not mentioned except as an
"Unknown Person" but later, after the decree of foreclosure was entered, filed
his motion to set aside said decree, then abandoned said motion, and filed a
new action of foreclosure, HELD, that plaintiff submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Court, by filing his motion, and he should have pursued his motion,
since he failed to do this he is now precluded from a recovery on his new
action.-Judgment affirmed.
PERSONAL INJURIES-INsuRANCE-EVIENCE oF-Phelps vs. Loustalet,
et al.-No. 12675--Decided September 26, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Moore.

I.

In an action involving personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff where
there was .some conflict in the evidence concerning the cause of the damage,
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it was error to permit the plaintiff to testify that he told one of the defendants,

"Jay, I guess I will have to sue you, and he says go ahead that is why I carry
insurance."

II.

Under such circumstances, the admonition and instruction by the Court
to the jury to disregard the testimony of the plaintiff was insufficient. The
error could not be cured.-Judgment reversed.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACTS DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN-EFFECT oF-The Illinois Building Company vs. Patterson, et

al.-No. 12372--Decided September 26, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Alter.
I.
Plaintiff, Patterson, claims office furniture and fixtures sold by him to
Investors Bond and Mortgage Company. Defendant was the landlord for
Investors Bond and Mortgage Company, on a lease which provided* that the
landlord should have a valid first lien for all unpaid rentals. The plaintiff
had sold the furniture and fixtures to the mortgage company under a purported "lease of goods". The lease of goods was not acknowledged but was
recorded. The office lease was unrecorded and unacknowledged. Upon the
failure of the mortgage company to pay the rent and to complete the payments due under the lease of goods, this controversy arose as an action for
replevin.
II.
Where plaintiff takes the position that a purported lease of goods
constitutes a conditional sales contract, he must comply with the Chattel

Mortgage Act.
III.
Since Coors versus Regan, 44 Colorado 126, conditional sales, as against
third persons having no notice thereof and who are injuriously affected thereby,
are treated as absolute sales.

IV.
Conditional sales contracts intended to have the effect of mortgages or
liens must comply with the Chattel Mortgage Act and be acknowledged and
recorded.-Judgment reversed.
Justices Butler, Moore and Hilliard dissent.
Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

I.
There is a distinction between a chattel mortgage and a conditional
sales contract. Under a conditional sales contract there is no absolute obligation to pay the purchase price. The contrary is true under a chattel mortgage.
The confusion "arose by reason of the loose and inaccurate use by this Court
of the term "conditional sale."
Before the Coor versus Regan case, the
distinction was properly recognized. The cases cited to support the decision
in Coors versus Regan are not in point.
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II.

Plaintiff was not estopped from asserting his title because of the fact
that the bond and mortgage company was put in possession of the furniture.
So too, the mortgage company could not transfer to the building company or
encumber a title that it did not have. The building company merely stands
in the position of the mortgage company.
III.
"If it is desirable to require the recording of conditional sale contracts,
such as the one involved in this proceeding, it would be better to accomplish
the purpose by act of the Legislature. * * *"
IV.
Chronologically, the lease of the office was first made by the mortgage
company. Subsequently, the mortgage company made its agreement with the
plaintiff. To hold that the office lease is now a lien on the furniture is to
hold that such a lease gives a mortgage or lien on after-acquired property.Judgment of the County Court should be affirmed.

CONTRACTS-AsSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS OF SALE DISTINGUISHED FROM
ASSIGNMENT OF THE PROPERTY ITSELF-Fowler State Bank vs. ElderNo. 13167-Decided September 26, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
Fowler State Bank sued Taylor and attached certain beans which were
sold by sheriff and proceeds retained awaiting determination of the action.
Elder intervened, claiming ownership as assignee of Taylor. The beans were
grown by Taylor on land leased from Elder, under a contract with a Seed
Company, whereby the Seed Company furnished the seed and were to be paid
in kind out of the crop grown; or if the seed did not reach a certain test,
payment in cash plus threshing costs. Taylor then assigned to Elder a certain
portion of the proceeds of beans as and when sold. Judgment for intervenor.
Held.-1. There was no assignment of the beans from Taylor to
intervenor. All that was assigned was the proceeds of sale.
2. Such assignment was ineffective against the attaching bank.
3. An assignment of proceeds to be derived from sale of property does
not carry an assignment of the property itself or against third parties without
notice.-Judgment reversed.

CONTRACTS-GRUBSTAKE CONTRACTS-RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTIES-

Bradley vs. Andrews-No. 12707-Decided October 3, 1932-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.

I.

While it is a settled rule that the party supplying the money is entitled
to his share of all profits on claims or oil locations made during the life of
the contract, it is also true, as in this case, that, where the person who is
supplying the money fails and refuses to continue so that the other party does

89

DICTA

not have the necessary money for expenses, then the latter may terminate
the contract.
II.
The party supplying funds under a grubstake contract, having been
fully apprised of all facts and information in the hands of the other party,
cannot complain if, after he has failed to provide necessary funds and the
other party has advised him that the contract is terminated, a third person
provides the necessary funds and valuable locations are made. It is unfair
to give one who has failed to comply with the contract any benefits which
might arise after the contract has been terminated.-Judgment reversed.

IPSA LOQUITUR-The Yellow Cab Company
vs. Hodgson, et al.-No. 12677-Decided October 3, 1932-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Alter.
I.

CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-RES

In a complaint alleging negligence against two parties, one an individual
and the other a public carrier, when the complaint contains an allegation that
the specific acts of negligence are not within the knowledge of the plaintiff,
it is error to attempt to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as against
either of the defendants.
II.
Where plaintiff was a paying passenger in a cab and the defendants
are the cab company and another party who collided with the cab in which
the plaintiff was riding, no presumption of negligence arises as against either
defendant.
III.
"Where either one of two defendants wholly independent of each other
may be responsible for the injury complained of, the rule of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be applied." The doctrine does not dispense with the general rule
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
IV.
Where the evidence clearly establishes the fact that the injury may have
resulted from the concurrent negligence of two or more persons or causes,
not both under the management and control of either of the defendants, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.-Judgment reversed.

LIBEL-CRIMINAL-MALICE-MITIGATION-SFFICIENCY

OF

INFORMA-

TION-Bearman v. The People-No. 13,055-Decided October 31, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

Bearman was found guilty of criminal libel and was sentenced to
imprisonment in the Penitentiary. He seeks a reversal of the judgment.
1. A defendant, in a prosecution for criminal libel, is not entitled to
introduce evidence showing absence of malice on his part where the publication
is libelous per se, except, where the publication is one of qualified privilege.
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2. A communication made bona fide upon a subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or
duty; although it contains incriminatory matter, which, without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable.
3. The privilege is lost if the defendant, in regard to the persons to
whom the publication is made, goes beyond the limits which his own protection or his duty requires.
4. The information is not duplicitous in that in one count it charges
that Bearman libeled several persons; nor is it duplicitous because Bearman
charged Dr. Bronfin with several and distinct acts of misconduct committed
by him at different times.
5. It was not error in admitting in evidence the letter sent out by
defendant because it contained libelous matters that were not set out in the
indictment.-Judgment affirmed.

BANKS AND BANKING-DIRECTORS'

LIABILITY-ARISES

WHEN--SWenson

vs. McFerson, et al-No. 13,105-Decided November 7, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. When a person becomes a director of a Bank not having complied
with the statutory requirements, he makes himself liable for the stockholders'
statutory liability just as though he did own the stock.
2. Defendant Swenson was the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. While the estate was in the process of probate, defendant's
name was brought up to become a director in the Bank. The estate owned
ten shares of the bank stock. The eligibility of the defendant to act as a
director was questioned, the president assured those present that he would
"take care of it". Thereafter, the defendant signed the minutes of directors'
meetings as a director and otherwise acted in that capacity. The president
assigned to the defendant five shares of his own stock. He, however, retained
possession of the stock. At the time of becoming a director, she took an oath
that she was the owner of five shares even though she did not actually own
stock. As long as she had held herself out to the public as being an owner,
a judgment against her on the stockholders' liability is good.-Judgment
affirmed.
TORT-PERSONAL

INJURY-CHANGE

OF

VENUE-INSTRUCTIONS-Ex-

CESSIVE VERDIcT-Robbins v. Mclister-No. 12,687-Decided Novem-

ber 14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
McAlister recovered judgment for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile collision in the sum of $3,215.46 actual damages and punitive
damages in the sum of $100.00. Defendant appealed.
1. In an action for tort, the county where the defendant resides and
the county where the plaintiff resides and the defendant is served, and the
county where the tort was committed are equally proper places for trial; and
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if the action is commenced in any one of these counties, the place of trial
cannot be changed on the ground that the county designated is not the proper
county.
2. The question of residence is compounded of fact and intention. It
includes a location with an intent to remain there as a place of fixed, present
domicile.
3. On the question of residence of the plaintiff, whether or not he is
a qualified elector is immaterial. Where punitive damages are asked for,
this does not constitute this an action to recover penalty which must be tried
where the cause arose. This was an action to recover compensatory damages
and punitive damages were only an incident to and not the basis of the cause
of action.
5. Instructions approved.
6. The verdict was not excessive, nor was it the result of passion or
prejudice.-Judgment affirmed.

INJUNCTIONS-LIE

WHEN-QUO

WARRANTO-CORPORATIONS-DIREC-

TO OFFICE-Wolford, et al vs. Bankers Security Life Co.
et al-No. 13,193-Decided November 14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
1. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants were wrongfully retaining their offices as directors of the Bankers Security Life Company; the
plaintiffs allege their right to the offices and seek an injunction, charging the
defendants to vacate the office, turn over the company property and to restrain
them from interfering with the officers and directors of the company. A
demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The defendants stood on the
demurrer and allege error, the main contention being that in as much as the
legal remedy of quo warranto was adequate, the action for injunction will
not lie.
2. Under circumstances as outlined above, where the real purpose of
the proceeding is to determine the title to the office of director and where
there is no paramount equity involved, quo warranto is the proper remedy.
3. The contention that an office in a private corporation is a franchise
is untenable.
4. Where a plain and adequate remedy at law is to be had, an injunction
will be denied.-Judgment reversed with directions.
TORS-RIGHT

NON-Surr-PRIMA FACIE CAsE-FRAuD--FIcTrrious BONDS--INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICE--nowden v. Taggart-No. 12,801-

Decided November 14, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
1. A non-suit is improper where the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case.
2. Bonds of a foreign corporation, issued in direct violation of the
statutes of the foreign jurisdiction, are void ab initio.
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3. One who causes fictitious bearer bonds of a corporation to be issued
or circulated thereby commits a tort upon a remote purchaser of the bonds,
who buys them relying on the fraudulent representations made in the bonds.
4. Where a corporate officer is a tort feasor he will be liable individually for his wrongdoing regardless of the liability which may attach to the
corporation itself for the tort.-Judgment reversed and cause -remanded.

WATER RIGHTS-INCREASE IN NATURAL FLOW OF STREAM-WHo IS ENTITLED TO-BURDEN OF PRooF-The Leadville Mining Development Co.
vs. Anderson, et al.-No. 12773-Decided November 21, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Butler.

1. It is well settled that, where a person by his own efforts has increased
the flow of water in a natural stream, he is entitled to the use of the water
to the extent of the increase.
2. To become entitled to the use of an increased flow in the water, a
party must prove that the water thus added to the stream was the result of
his efforts and that, if not interfered with but left to flow in accordance
with natural laws, it would not have reached the stream. This he must prove
by clear and satisfactory evidence.
3. Plaintiff owned and operated an irrigation tunnel. The tunnel
passed through a porphyry dike, at which point there was a considerable
increase in the flow of water. Plaintiff contended that the porphyry dike was
impervious to the water and that, without the penetration of the dike by the
plaintiff, said water would never have reached the river. Plaintiff's expert
witnesses testified that probably a small amount of the water had formerly
penetrated the dike and had reached the river. The trial court held that the
plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of proving that, prior to the penetration of the dike, the same waters did not formerly arrive at the same river
through seepage and so forth. Examination of the record does not permit
the findings of the trial court to be disturbed.-Judgment affirmed.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-ExcEPTIONs-ERORs--REvIEW ON COURT'S
OWN MOTION-IMPLIED CONTRAcT-LEGAL CONCLUSION-FAcTS SUFFICIENT-Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Association-No. 12703Decided November 28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

1.

Sections 66 and 422, Code of Civil Procedure, do away with the

necessity of objecting or excepting to an order entered upon a written motion
to strike.

2. Failure to argue an assignment of error does not foreclose consideration. A reviewing court, on its own motion, may correct an error apparent on
the face of the record, such as the improper granting of a motion to strike.
3. If the nature of a man's profession or business is such as to imply
the guarantee of certain conduct, the assurance that he will follow that line
of conduct is implied in all contracts made with him for his services. This is
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true of a mortician and requires of him a decent respect for the feelings of
persons employing his services.
4. An allegation that an act was done in a "reckless, willful and wanton"
manner will not be stricken as constituting a mere legal conclusion.
5. A complaint which alleged an oral contract for the services of a
mortician, including an express or implied agreement that the mortician would
not unnecessarily inflict mental suffering upon the employer by undue publicity
or notoriety, and which set out as a breach thereof the fact that the mortician
caused widespread publication to be given to a photograph showing the body
of a deceased person being transferred from an airplane to a hearse, stated a
good cause of action for violation of a contract and for damages for mental
suffering therefrom.-Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Campbell, dissenting:
1. There is no justification for the action of a reviewing court in restoring to a complaint matter stricken therefrom, where the plaintiff admits

the irrelevancy of the matter stricken and does not urge a review of the ruling
on the motion to strike.
CONTRACTS -

CONSTRUCTION-

ORAL

MODIFICATION -

AMENDMENT

TO

JUDGMENT-Thompson, etc. v. Sweet-No. 12717-Decided November

28, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Document construed and held to be a contract of purchase and sale,
and not an option to purchase. Such expressions as "seller", "buyer", "as part
payment", referred to as aids in construction.
2. Fact that the buyer resold to a third person and arranged with the
seller for delivery to the third person is proper evidence of the construction
placed on the document by the buyer.
3. All material oral modifications of a written contract, either preceding
or coincident with its execution and delivery, are presumed in law to be merged
into the writing.
4. Amendment of the judgment against a partnership, after approval
of the bill of exceptions and expiration of the term, so as to include a joint
and several judgment against the individual partners, was mere correction of
a clerical error.-Judgment affirmed.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION OF-GENERAL AND SPECIFIC BEQUESTS OF STOCK

Annie Bond vs. Wim. L. Evans, Executor Will of Henry M. Fickinger,
deceased-No. 12,756-Decided December 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Adams.
1. A paragraph of the will read as follows: "Fifth: Fifteen (15) shares
New York Central Railroad Stock to Mrs. Annie Bond . . ." At the time of
the execution of the will testator owned fifteen shares of such stock evidenced
by one certificate. At the time of his death he owned these shares and also
one more, evidenced by a separate certificate.

DICTA
2. This was a general, not a specific, bequest, and the stock owned by
testator at time of his death, together with all dividends accruing thereon,
belonged to the estate, and not to the legatee.
3. A bequest of a stated sum or number of shares of a designated corporation without further explanation and without more particularly referring
to and indicating the identical shares intended to be bequeathed is not a specific
legacy, but will be construed as a general legacy.-Judgment affirmed.

ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS--SUIT TO SET ASIDE GIFT-BURDEN OF
PROOF-TIME FOR OBJEcTIONS-ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY-Norris

v. Bradshaw-No. 12,710-Decided December 19, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler.
1. Where a purported gift from donor to his son-in-law would leave
an insufficient amount in the donor's estate to pay the widow's allowance and
it appears the gift was made so as to defeat such allowance, the donee has
the burden of proving the honesty and good faith of the transaction.
2. If a witness is competent to testify to matters which happened after
decedent's death, an objection to his testimony concerning matters happening
prior to decedent's death, which objection was made after the witness was
sworn, was in apt time. Milsap v. Stone, 2 Colo. 137, overruled in this respect.
3. In equity proceedings an assignment of error based on admission of
alleged inadmissible evidence will be considered only where there is not sufficient unobjectionable evidence to sustain the decree.
4. Fact that a gift to defendant was intended for the benefit of defendant and his wife would make the wife directly interested in the suit by the
donor's administratrix to set the gift aside and the wife's testimony concerning
the transaction is not admissible.
5. Sec. 6556 C. L. 1921 does not justify admission of defendant's testimony concerning a conversation between himself and a person since deceased,
held in presence of defendant's wife, who was an heir of the decedent, where
the wife's interest is hostile to the decedent's estate.-Judgment reversed and
cause remanded.
NEGLIGENCE-

ORDINANCES-

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

DELEGATION

OF

POwER--Staley vs. Vaughn-No. 12,759-Decided December 19, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
Vaughn was driving an automobile on East 14th Ave., in Denver, which
is designated and marked as a "Stop-street" pursuant to City Ordinance
authorizing the manager of safety to designate "thru" streets or "Stop"
streets. Staley was approaching 14th Ave., on Franklin St., and failed to stop
his car before entering 14th Ave., and crashed into the Vaughn car. Vaughn
recovered judgment, and Staley brings error claiming the ordinance unconstitutional.

DICTA
The City Council undoubtedly has power under the Charter to regulate
vehicular traffic, and in pursuance of that power to designate "Stop streets".
The designation of certain streets as "Stop streets", is purely an administerial
act and may be delegated to the manager of safety. We believe that this
ordinance does not violate the constitution, but on the contrary we believe
it to be wise, necessary and proper legislation.-Judgmentaffirmed. En banc.
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